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John J. McCall
The papers in this volume were presented at a conference on the eco-
nomics of information and uncertainty held in Boston in June of 1979 and
sponsored by the Universities—National Bureau Committee for Eco-
nomic Research.' The papers cover a broad range of topics and at first
glance may appear unrelated. Of course, each of the papers is concerned
with a particular aspect of either the economics of information or the
economics of uncertainty, but this, in itself, is a relatively weak link.
There is, however, a fundamental theme that does create strong interac-
tions among these essays, namely, the role of incentives, risk, and risk
sharing in organizational structure. Since this theme permeates and uni-
fies much of the recent literature on the economics of uncertainty,2 we
begin this introduction with an elaboration of its origins and ramifica-
• tions.
• This basic theme has received considerable attention in three different
literatures: the theory of finance, organization theory, and the economics
of insurance. In the recent literature on organization theory and insur-
ance, the intersection between the set of organizational concepts and the
set of insurance concepts is so large that it is no longer useful to distin-
guish between these two disciplines. Thus, in our discussion of organiza-
tion theory we see that topics like moral hazard and adverse selection,
which formerly belonged exclusively to insurance theory, are precisely
the problems that have vivified the new organizational research.
John J. McCall is professor of economics at the University of California, Los Angeles.
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The theory of finance was one of the first to recognize the importance
of uncertainty in comprehending economic behavior. This is not surpris-
ing since the stock market cannot be ignored by financial analysts. The
first tasks of finance were to explain the stochastic behavior of the stock
market and its role in a capitalist economy. Thus, Bachelier, by inventing
Brownian motion to explain stock price fluctuations, and Arrow, by
perceiving the risk sharing function of the stock market, laid the ground-
work for modern finance.
Arrow pointed to the stock market as the main institution for shifting
the risks of business from entrepreneurs to the general public. Individuals
can diversify their portfolios to achieve an acceptable level of expected
return for a given level of risk. This ability to pool risks enables firms to
undertake projects that would otherwise be unacceptable. Thus, society
is better off. The stock market is not a perfect risk pooling entity like the
futures market. It is unable to separate production and risk, leaving the
former to the manager and transferring the latter to the general public.
Instead, with the issuance of stock the firm's owners and managers are.
separated and the profit maximizing incentives of the managers are
diluted. Thus, the inability of stockholders to monitor managers' efforts
gives rise to a moral hazard problem.
The study of stock market fluctuations and the stock market as a risk
pooling institution has led to important contributions like the capital asset
pricing model, the options pricing model, the efficient market hypothesis,
the Modigliani-Miller theorem, and recent research on the theory of the
firm.3 This last endeavor has given us new concepts like spanning and
unanimity from which an entirely new perspective for evaluating a firm's
behavior has emerged.
Several of the papers in this volume make important contributions to
finance. In the past, ideas have tended to move from finance to eco-
nomics. In his paper B rock returns the favor and shows how some of the
recent economic research in growth theory and rational expectations can
be used to enrich the extant financial models. Kreps conducts an intensive
study of the Black-Scholes option pricing model and shows that its power
depends on some very delicate properties that are not robust. Kihistrom
and Laffont extend the theory of the firm by including stockholders as
decision makers. The efficiency of the ensuing competitive allocation of
risk and capital is studied in detail. Grossman and Hart, by demonstrat-
ing how the financial structure of the corporation affects the incentives of
the managers, suggest how the market resolves the moral hazard problem
with the issuance of stock.
From our discussion of the finance literature it is clear that stochastic
considerations have led to a reformulation of the theory of the firm.
There is, of course, another vast literature on organization theory which
has joined with the finance literature in promulgating this "new" theory
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of the firm. Let us spend a moment reviewing this organizational
literature.4
The basicproblemin any organization from the beehive to IBM is to
design decision making procedures that are "best" for achieving organi-
zational goals. There are two reasons why this problem is difficult and
interesting. First, members of the organization may possess individual
goals that are quite different from the primary goal of the organization.
Second, the decision making procedures must be based on incomplete
information. From this description it is clear that organizational decision
making takes place in an agency setting. Thus, the problems arise be-
cause of the divergence of incentives between the organization (princi-
pal) and its members (agents) as well as the differential costof obtaining
pertinent information.5 For example, the manager observes an outcome
that depends on the state of nature and the actions of the agent. Usually it
is costly to distinguish the state of nature from these actions. If thiscost is
not incurred, the manager is unable to determine the relative contribu-
tion of each to the outcome. Since rewards are based on the outcome, the
manager would surely like to separate the outcome into the part attribut-
able to the actions of the agent and the part due to the state of nature.
This is, of course, the essence of the moral hazard problem. Among the
more "specific" results in this area are the recent ones of Harris and
Raviv (1979). They demonstrate that monitorilig the agent does not pay if
the agent is risk neutral or if the relation between his action and the
outcome is freely observable. When monitoring does pay, they show that
"any Pareto optimal contract can be approximated by an 'all-or-nothing'
type of contract.'.' If the action is "acceptable," the agent is paid; other-
wise he receives nothing.
In any firm there are at least three distinct groups of participants:
stockholders, managers, and owners of nonmanagerial inputs. The three
groups voluntarily collaborate in pursuit of a common goal. The common
goal that binds these groups must be strong enough to withstand the
disintegrating forces that are unleashed when each group pursues its own
objective and each individual looks to his own welfare. Even when the
common bond is sufficiently strong to preserve the integrity of the orga-
nization, the problems of decision making under uncertainty remain.
Because decisions must be based on imperfect information, the orga-
nization's welfare is always in jeopardy. A decision that was best in an ex
ante sense may nevertheless impose great costs on the organization and
indeed may even lead to its demise. These hazards or risks, which are
fundamental and intrinsic to life as we know it, are allocated among the
members of the organization. This allocation must be conducted in such a
way that individual incentives are preserved. In order to obtain a proper
allocation, due regard must be given to the timing of information, the risk
preferences of the organization's members, and the role of chance factorsxiv John J. McCall
in determining outcomes. In many applications it is difficult if not im-
possible to "give due regard." It is especially hard to distinguish between
the roles of chance and individual effort in determining outcomes. It is
natural to attribute good outcomes to our personal effort while blaming
fickle nature for untoward events. An appropriate allocation can be
accomplished by means of the Pareto optimal contracting that was dis-
cussed in the theory of agency. Thus, in certain circumstances it will be in
the interest of the employees to subject themselves to monitoring in order
to control shirking and to dismissal if their conduct deviates from an
agreed-upon norm.
The literature on decision making in organizations has till recently
concentrated on the informational problem and assumed that all mem-
bers possessed a common objective function. In their seminal work
Marschak and Radner (1972) studied the behavior of organizations by
developing a theory of teams. They recognized that the members of any
organization differ in three important respects: first, they control differ-
ent actions; second, they each have access to different information on
which they base their actions; and third, they have different goals. Their
theory of teams concentrates on the first two differences and for all
practical purposes ignores differences in goals. Thus restricted, their
analysis derives the optimal decision function for a particular information
structure and evaluates alternative information structures.
The major point made by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) is that the
genesis of the capitalist firm is founded on imperfect information. They
emphasize that the firm is not a jail in which conflicts are resolved by
decree. Members of the firm—employers and employees—are voluntary
participants in a cooperative venture. But why all this confusion about
the control that the boss exercises over the worker's welfare? Aichian and
Demsetz argue that this control is not dictatorial but instead jointly
agreed to by both employee and employer. The essence of the control is
the monitoring function performed by management. Monitoring is neces-
sary because the firm's production function depends on team output. In
the absence of monitoring some team members would shirk. The main
function of management is to deter shirking by monitoring inputs and
firing malingerers. Management's reward for this monitoring takes the
form of a residual claim on output.
In their recent paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) show how the finan-
cial structure of the firm is affected by moral hazard. They first study the
moral hazard associated with the issuance of stock. If the manager owns
the entire firm in the sense that he is the only stockholder, his decisions
will be such as to maximize his utility. Assume that his utility derives from
both pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns. The nonpecuniary returns
flow from Alchian amenities like thick rugs, friendly staff, etc. Now
suppose that he sells some fraction a of his stock to outsiders. The
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outsiders and the manager have identical incentives with respect to
pecuniary returns, but the outsiders do not share in the nonpecuniary
returns. This gives rise to moral hazard and monitoring because the
manager captures the full benefit of the nonpecuniary returns whereas he
only pays (1 —a)for their total and marginal cost. As a increases, his
incentive to spend resources on perquisites also increases and of course
the outsiders will have a greater incentive to monitor the manager's
behavior. The difference between the value of the solely owned firm and
one in which the manager owns (1 —a)measures the cost of agency
(apart from the tax benefits associated with the perquisites).
A similar moral hazard problem exists for debt. Suppose that the
owner-manager has a small amount invested in the firm and relies on
bondholders to finance the rest. Since he is the residual claimant, the
smaller his stake in the enterprise relative to that of the bondholders, the
greater his incentive to undertake investments that have high payoffs if
successful. When such an investment is a success, he pays the bondholder
afixed fee and the owner gets the residual. If the investment fails, most of
the cost is borne by the bondholders. Thus, it behooves the bondholders
to police the manager's behavior.
Three of the papers in this volume address various aspects of the moral
hazard problem that afflicts organizational decision making. The paper
by Green extends the theory of teams to the situation where the two
participants in decision making do not have identical utility functions.
One participant gathers information and transmits it to the other, who
makes the decision. Because of the different utility functions, it may pay
the collector of information to dissemble. Green measures the value of
information and shows that the value of improved information may be
negative. Grossman and Hart show how the threat of bankruptcy can
mitigate the moral hazard created by the inability of stockholders to
monitor the manager's effort. Mortensen is concerned with the genesis of
organizations. How do the members of an organization find one another?
This is characterized as a problem of search. Mortensen shows how the
allocation of the organization's output among its members affects the
intensity with which they search. An externality occurs because the
searcher in picking his search intensity only considers his own expected
benefit from the match. Mortensen shows how contracts can be designed
to solve this incentive problem.
Carlton, and Porter and Spence study other aspects of the theory of the
firm. Canton shows that the presence of uncertainty may alter our
attitude toward monopoly. In particular, he argues that under uncer-
tainty a market structure that has both monopolistic and competitive
features may be preferable tO either pure monopoly or pure competition.
Porter and Spence present a practical application of organization theory
that illustrates how an organization makes decisions under uncertaintyxvi John J. McCall
when there is a high degree of dependence between its actions and those
of its rivals. Previous discussions focused on organizations operating
within a competitive environment. Thus, conflict among firms and
strategic considerations were absent. The papers by Carlton, and Porter
and Spence investigate situations in which strategic considerations can no
longer be ignored. In Porter and Spence's paper, the market structure is
oligopolistic and the reactions of firms to their competitors is crucial. In
Carlton's paper the market is monopolistic with a competitive fringe, and
limit pricing is one of the strategic devices used by the monopolist.
We conclude the introduction with a more detailed summary of each
essay.
The paper "Asset Prices in a Production Economy," by William A.
Brock, generalizes the capital asset pricing model in two directions. First,
it is made dynamic by constructing an intertemporal model; second, this
dynamic model is formulated in a general equilibrium framework.
Brock's intertemporal general equilibrium model is obtained by an artis-
tic linkage of several relatively independent contributions in finance and
economics. These include the stochastic growth model of Brock-Mirman,
Merton's intertemporal capital asset pricing model, Lucas's asset pricing
model, and Ross's arbitrage theory of asset pricing. The equilibrium
concept is one of rational expectations. While the paper is very theoreti-
cal, Brock's goal is to answer basic economic questions like the effect of
increased progessivity in income taxes on the relative prices of risky
assets. Empirical research utilizing B rock's framework strikes me as very
important. Depending upon one's perspective this work can be viewed as
enriching the thriving finance theory "industry" or as arresting the de-
cline of the growth theory "industry" by embedding market institutions
into, the standard stochastic growth models.
Dennis W. Carlton's paper, "Planning and Market Structure," evalu-
ates alternative market organizations according to their ability to plan
production in response to information about consumer demands. Canton
adopts a Schumpeterian stance and argues that the incentives in competi-
tive markets are such that the acquisition of information about demand
uncertainty is inefficient. Unlike the competitive firm, a monopoly does
have incentives to gather this information and adjust its production
accordingly. However, Carlton shows via an example that the benefits
accruing to a monopolist from planning are unlikely to offset the
monopoly's deadweight loss. Thus, even in the presence of imperfect
information a competitive market structure may be preferred to a
monopoly. Canton then introduces a market composed of a dominant
firm, which may be a cartel, and a competitive fringe. He shows that this
mixed market structure is preferable to either pure competition or pure
monopoly. In the mixed structure the incentives for planning reside in the
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dominant firm, so society reaps the planning benefits of monopoly. At
the same time, the deadweight loss of monopoly is reduced by the
discipline imposed by the competitive fringe. In its effort to control the
size of the competitive fringe, the dominant firm pursues a policy that
looks like predatory pricing but is socially superior to the policy of either
pure competition or pure monopoly.
The paper "Statistical Decision Theory Requiring Incentives for In-
formation Transfer," by Jerry Green, studies the transfer of information
within an organization. The organization is composed of two members.
The distinguishing assumption of Green's analysis is that the utility
functions of the two members are different. Thus, it may be optimal for
the first agent to adjust the information before transmission. For this
environment Green shows that, with two actions and two observations,
either the information is valueless or a first-best can be achieved. If there
are more than two actions, a randomized strategy may be optimal. The
randomized strategy is remarkable in that positive probabilities may be
attached to dominated actions. The reason for this is that such a strategy
by the decision maker may induce veracity in his otherwise unreliable
colleague. Green then proves that the decision maker may not want to
improve the information structure of his unreliable agent; i.e., the value
of "better" information, in the Blackwell sense, may be negative. Green
concludes on a positive note by showing that, when there are only two
possible observations, the value of improving the agent's information to
the decision maker is necessarily nonnegative.
In "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives," San-
ford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart develop a new equilibrium concept
to resolve the conflict that exists between the managers of a firm and the
firm's stockholders. This conflict is another manifestation of the moral
hazard problem. In general, shareholders will not be able to monitor
management's actions and management's objective function may be
quite different from that of the shareholders. The threat of takeover and
management compensation schemes like stock options mitigate this
moral hazard. Grossman and Hart suggest a third method, viz., the
issuance of debt, which, by creating a probability of bankruptcy, an event
which is assumed to impose high costs on management, induces the
managers to take actions that reduce the bankruptcy probability. Of
course, that probability is minimized when the managers maximize
profits. Thus, if the costs of bankruptcy are sufficiently high, the issuance
of debt eliminates the moral hazard problem. Grossman and Hart show
how this resolution occurs in a mature corporation where the financial
structure is determined by the management. The market value of the firm
is positively related to its level of debt. But managers benefit from high
market value because their compensation may be related to marketxviii John J. McCall
value, because the probability of takeover is nonincreasing in market
value, and because the cost of raising additional capital is nonincreaslng
in market value.
In their paper "A Competitive Entrepreneurial Model of a Stock
Market," Richard E. Kihlstrom and Jean-Jacques Laffont adopt Dia-
mond's notion of efficiency and extend results like his to circumstances in
which technologies do not exhibit stochastic constant returns to scale. In
their model, firms are created and run by entrepreneurs who maximize
expected utility. The entrepreneurs are permitted to make personal
portfolio decisions in addition to the financial decisions that they make as
managers. The firm is competitive in that it is a price taker in all markets.
Entry is restricted only by the fixed fee that each entrant must pay.
Furthermore, there are infinitely many individuals, each of which belongs
to one of several types. Any individual is a potential entrepreneur. A final
condition for competition is that returns across firms be stochastically
dependent. One of the consequences of their model is that whether or not
an individual becomes an entrepreneur is a matter of indifference in
equilibrium. A necessary condition for this indifference is the absence of
arbitrage opportunities in equilibrium. This will be the case when the
Miller-Modigliani theorem obtains and the market value of the resources
devoted to a firm equals its equilibrium value.
The authors introduce a special kind of rational expectations called
"classical expectations" and prove that, when these expectations hold, an
equilibrium exists. This equilibrium has several interesting properties.
The optimal portfolio of an individual possesses a nondiversification
property in that for entrepreneurs it includes shares in his own firm or in
firms that are managed like his, whereas for nonentrepreneurs it includes
shares in firms that are managed like firms he would establish. Another
equilibrium property is that the number of types of firms equals the
number of types of individuals in the economy. Each type of individual
holds shares only in firms created by entrepreneurs of the same type.
Kihlstrom and Laffont refer to this as a clientele effect and show that it
results in unanimous agreement among shareholders in the firm's goals.
The equilibrium presented reduces to Diamond's when the technology
has stochastic constant returns to scale. Furthermore, the model reduces
to the perfectly competitive equilibrium when uncertainty is eliminated.
Finally, the model reveals that a stock market will be necessary only when
all three of the following conditions are satisfied: costs of entry are fixed,
and uncertainty and risk aversion are present for a large number of
investors. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the economy
achieves the same allocation without a stock market.
In "Multiperiod Securities and the Efficient Allocation of Risk: A
Comment on the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model," David M. Kreps
conducts a sophisticated mathematical analysis of the Black-Scholes op-
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tion pricing model. A Debreu-style economy is presented in which the
Black-Scholes prices, which are exogenous in their model, are now
endogenously determined. In this general equilibrium setting, Kreps
specifies a necessary and sufficient condition for this Debreu economy to
possess a complete set of markets. Of course, when this condition is
satisfied, the equilibrium allocation corresponding to these equilibrium
option prices is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions involve the equilibrium prices. Kreps then examines the
robustness of this model and asks whether, for small deviations from
these necessary and sufficient conditions, the resulting economy will
possess markets that are approximately complete and the allocation of
risk will be approximately efficient. Answers to these questions are quite
difficult. The following summary statement by Kreps is most illumi-
nating:
Frequent trading makes it possible for a few securities to span many
states of nature. Whether markets are "perfectly" complete depends
critically on the fine structure of the way in which uncertainty resolves.
But the condition required for complete markets is not "nearly" re-
quired for "approximately" complete markets. If equilibrium prices
approximate an ideal model in a fairly coarse sense, and if that idea!
mode! has perfectly complete markets, then markets in the origina!
model will give nearly efficient equilibrium allocations. Thus if actual
security prices behave "like" those in the Black-Scholes model (mean-
ing here the genera! class of diffusion process models for which markets
are complete), risk is allocated approximately efficiently.
In his paper "The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bargaining
Game," Dale T. Mortensen investigates the formation of organizations.
There is imperfect information in that the identities and/or locations of
potential members are not known in advance. Information about poten-
tial members is acquired by search. The rule for dividing the surplus of
any match among its members affects the intensity with which prospec-
tive members search. Matched agents do not search, and the rate at which
matches form is endogenously determined by the search intensities
selected by unmatched agents. Mortensen shows that in general the joint
Nash choice of such intensities and the associated matching process are
inefficient. In his quest for efficiency Mortensen considers linear and
quadratic matching technologies. In the first the probability of forming a
match in a small period of time is independent of the number of un-
matched agents. In the second this probability is proportional to the
number of unmatched agents.
Given a linear technology, the search intensities selected by un-
matched agents are too low to achieve efficiency. The choice of a search
intensity is not affected by the rewards received by the other number of
the match. Mortensen shows that, if the agent responsible for the matchxx John J. McCall
receives all of its surplus, joint wealth is maximized by the Nash choice of
such intensities. However, this arrangement fails to achieve efficiency for
the quadratic technology. In addition to the externality just discussed for
the linear case, there is a second externality present in the quadratic
technology: more intensive search reduces the probability of meeting an
unmatched agent. Thus, by this second externality individuals search too
much. Mortensen shows that efficiency is restored when the agent re-
sponsible for the match, the matchmaker, receives a fraction f of the
surplus, where ½ ￿f￿ 1. Finally, Mortensen demonstrates that for both
tech nologies there is a unique division of the match's surplus such that all
unmatched agents search efficiently.
In their paper "The Capacity Expansion Process in a Growing Oli-
gopoly: The Case of Corn Wet Milling," Michael E. Porter and A.
Michael Spence vividly describe how uncertainty affects economic deci-
sion making. How should a firm in an evolving oligopolistic industry
augment its productive capacity? The cost of not making such additions
when it should is that its industry position will erode. On the other hand,
overexpansion will also have a deleterious effect on profits. Factors that
should be incorporated in this decision include the following: stochastic
lead times with large expected values, expectations about future demand,
and the usual strategic considerations that are characteristic of oligopolis-
tic industries. Porter and Spence conduct their study of the capacity
expansion decision for the corn wet milling industry. They conclude from
this analysis that it is possible to calculate the most likely capacity deci-
sions for firms in an expanding oligopolistic industry. The equilibrium
concept used in making this calculation is one of rational expectations.
They consider the study of expectations formation an extremely impor-
tant topic of future research. Another significant finding is that a strategy
of preemptive investment is rendered unattractive by the presence of
uncertainty. Thus, uncertainty eliminates outcomes in which a large
market share is lodged in a few firms.
Notes
1. For their help in organizing the conference, I am indebted to Buz Brock, Rich
Kihlstrom, Steve Lippman, Dale Mortensen, Chris Mortensen, Mike Rothschild, Mike
Spence, and George Stigler.
2. For two recent surveys of this literature, see Hirshleifer and Riley (1979) and Lippman
and McCall (1981). The reader may also wish to consult the proceedings of two previous
conferences on the economics of information published in the Quarterly Journal of Eco-
no,nics, November 1976, and the Review of Economic Studies, October 1977. See also
Diamond and Rothschild (1978).
3. For excellent surveysof this recent research, see Baron (1979) and Kreps (1979).
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4.For a glimpse of this literature, see "Symposium on the Economics of Internal
Organizations" (1975).
5. See Arrow (1964), Harris and Raviv (1979), Hurwicz and Shapiro (1977), Ross (1973),
Shavell (1979), and Stiglitz (1974, 1975).
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